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NO. 36 SEPTEMBER 2018 Introduction 
On US Government Trade Policy 
Trump’s ‘America First’ Policy Puts Pressure on the EU 
Laura von Daniels 
Given the US tariffs on steel and aluminium and further tariff threats, the trans-
atlantic trade relationship remains tense. While EU Commission President Jean-
Claude Juncker and US President Donald Trump agreed at their meeting on 26 July 
to start negotiations to reduce tariffs in several industrial sectors over a period of 
120 days, it remains uncertain they can reach a compromise that allows both sides 
to save face. At the same time, Europe is struggling with an important, but as yet, 
unanswered question: Is the US government’s trade policy the result of a strategy 
designed to weaken geopolitical rivals like China, even if it adversely affects close 
partners such as the EU? Or does Trump really want to break away from the liberal 
multilateral order? The EU needs to prepare for both possibilities. Support could come 
increasingly from US companies. 
 
Since the start of the year, the US govern-
ment has been taking unilateral action 
hurting its trading partners. But the meas-
ures are not surprising. In his trading 
strategy from March 2017, President Trump 
announced the US was ready to push 
through its interests with little regard for 
international trade rules. Washington’s 
actions against different trade partners 
including the EU, Japan and China have 
triggered a spiral of escalation. Soon, US 
protectionist tariffs and retaliatory meas-
ures by several of its trading partners could 
affect trade flows worth more than 850 
billion euros (see Figure 1, p. 2). 
 
US trade measures and goals 
The US president is often said to have an 
erratic political style. However, with the 
trade policy measures implemented to date, 
he is pursuing clear objectives, some of 
which are domestic policy and others 
foreign policy. 
Firstly, on 22 January 2018, the US intro-
duced 20 to 50 percent protective tariffs 
and import quotas on washing machines 
and solar panels. US Secretary of Com-
merce, Wilbur Ross, said the tariffs, which 
impact trade worth around ten billion US 
dollars, were necessary to protect domestic 
industries against cheaper imports. In line  
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Figure 1 
Total trade volume affected by the global trade conflict since March 2017  
(in billions of US dollars) 
Source: Own diagram, based on data from the Peterson Institute for International Economics (2018), New York Times (13 July 2018), 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (11 July 2018). 
 
with national legislation (Section 201 of the 
US Trade Act of 1974), Trump was able to 
impose the tariffs without the consent of 
Congress. As a result, this was the first time 
the president had been able to push through 
his policy despite criticism from Republi-
cans, who traditionally advocate free trade. 
The second, even more serious, customs 
decision followed shortly thereafter. On 
8 March, the US government imposed 
tariffs of 25 percent on steel imports and 
ten percent on aluminium imports. Once 
again, Trump resorted to national legisla-
tion (Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expan-
sion Act) in order to wave through the 
tariffs without consulting Congress. The US 
government justified the metal tariffs on 
the grounds that cheap imports to the do-
mestic economy were an increasing “threat 
to national security”. Although this argu-
ment seems weak, it is impossible to say 
for sure whether the US has broken inter-
national trade law until a ruling has been 
made on the WTO case. At the same time, 
Washington’s actions have left its partners 
with few options, other than imposing their 
own tariffs to signal their resolve to protect 
EU interests. 
 By initially granting customs exemp-
tions to individual partners and offering 
bilateral negotiations, the US government 
has also succeeded in driving a wedge 
between the injured parties. Recent nego-
tiations on the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) provide a similar exam-
ple of Trump’s divide and rule approach. 
Initially, Mexico and Canada both rejected 
the US imposed conditions for exemption 
from the metal tariffs and refused to make 
far-reaching concessions on NAFTA. But 
after the US and Mexico announced on 27 
August that they have reached a bilateral 
trade agreement, Canada is under pressure 
to equally accept US conditions. Giving up 
the trade deal would create immense eco-
nomic costs. Also, domestic political costs 
for the government could rise quickly, a bit 
more than a year before federal elections. 
Trump could also succeed in forcing the 
EU to agree to either self-imposed export 
restrictions that he hopes would reduce the 
US trade deficit or to a major reduction of 
tariffs and entry barriers on US exports. 
There is no political consensus in the EU on 
whether to oppose the US or make conces-
sions. Earlier this year, European Commis- 
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Figure 2 
S&P 500 (USA), January–August 2018 CSI 300 (China), January–August 2018 
Source: http://www.bloomberg.com. 
 
sion President, Jean-Claude Juncker, stated 
that the EU refuses to negotiate a trade deal 
for as long as the US applies tariffs on EU 
metal exports. This position was pushed 
particularly by France. But on the other 
hand, Germany and other countries that 
count the US among their primary export 
destinations have any interest to prevent 
additional US tariffs, in particular on auto-
mobiles. 
The third radical US tariff decision is 
directed at China, but also affects EU inter-
ests. Since 6 July, the US government has 
imposed tariffs of 25 percent on Chinese 
imports, initially affecting goods worth 
around 34 billion US dollars. On 23 August, 
a second tranche of tariffs of 25 percent on 
Chinese goods worth 16 billion US dollars 
was implemented. In prior statements, 
Trump also threatened to extend a 25-per-
cent tariff on Chinese imports worth an 
additional 200 billion US dollars, after 
Beijing reacted with tariffs, particularly 
hurting US agricultural producers exporting 
soybeans to China. The US Department of 
Commerce justified the tariffs due to what 
it called “unfair trading practices” and more 
specifically, the systematic theft of intellec-
tual property, Chinese-imposed technology 
transfer and other government measures 
that impede market access for US compa-
nies. In this case, too, the president may act 
without consulting Congress in line with 
Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. Trump 
is apparently willing to impose tariffs on 
goods worth more than 500 billion US dol-
lars, which corresponds to China’s total 
exports to the US last year. It is true that 
China, like the EU, is one economic area 
that could make up the trade losses relatively 
easily with internal demand. Nevertheless, 
uncertainty in the financial markets driven 
by the trade dispute has already been detri-
mental to Chinese companies (see Figure 2). 
Given China’s high and rapidly growing 
private debt further uncertainty might even 
trigger a financial crisis that could see 
China’s development held back consider-
ably. However, Beijing has so far showed 
no signs of budging on US demands. 
Possible next steps 
Should the US President be unsatisfied with 
the results of negotiations with the EU over 
a tariff agreement he is likely to renew his 
threat of imposing tariffs on automobiles 
and parts. On 23 May, Secretary of Com-
merce Wilbur Ross was instructed by the 
president to consider initiating an investi-
gation into tariffs of 20 to 25 percent on 
automobiles and automobile parts “to de-
termine their effects on America’s national 
security”. These tariffs would affect not 
only the EU, but also Canada, Mexico, 
Japan, South Korea and China. Again, the 
US government argued there was a threat 
to national security (in line with Section 232 
of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act). A threat 
to national security can hardly be used as 
justification for tariffs on automobile im-
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ports. And import tariffs on automobile parts 
could even negatively affect US automobile 
manufacturers. Presently, domestic prod-
ucts can only fully replace imports at con-
siderable cost. Clearly, if the costs increase 
then jobs will be at risk. US economists 
estimate that a 25-percent tariff on auto-
mobiles alone would put nearly 200,000 US 
jobs at risk. And if trade partners impose 
counter-tariffs, job losses could be three 
times higher. For these reasons, car lob-
byists including the Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers, representing General Motors 
and Ford, have warned the administration 
against tariffs. Following protests, the Com-
merce Department has announced that it 
needs additional time to finish a compre-
hensive report initially due in late August. 
Finally, speculation about a US exit from 
the WTO has caused significant uncertainty. 
At the end of June, US newsletter Axios re-
ported that the US government was working 
on a bill which was very close to fulfilling 
Trump’s repeated desire for the US to with-
draw from the WTO. Initially, several mem-
bers of the government denied the report. A 
short time later, President Trump declared 
he was not seeking to withdraw from the 
WTO. In fact, he would not have had the 
authority to do so single-handedly. US legis-
lation on the WTO provides for a congres-
sional decision. Nevertheless, it is striking 
that Trump seems to be repeatedly trying to 
lend credence to his threat of withdrawal. 
Where is US policy headed? 
The US midterm elections will be held on 
6 November. While Trump effortlessly 
“serves” his political base with bold tariffs, 
free-market advocates have it tougher. This 
applies to opponents of the tariffs from the 
ranks of the Republicans who, according to 
election analyses, can expect to lose votes 
if they deviate from Trump’s positions. But 
it applies equally to Democrats. Trump’s 
policy not only targets their goals, such as 
increased control over foreign investors. 
Particularly for Democrats running for 
office in areas that mostly voted for Trump, 
it would be politically risky to oppose his 
‘America First’ policy. As a result, legislative 
initiatives such as that of Republican Sena-
tor Bob Corker have little chance of success: 
He wants to send the president’s tariff 
decisions on matters of “national security” 
back to Congress, especially if they concern 
US allies. So far Corker even failed to get 
support from Republican leaders for a vote 
on his legislative proposal. 
However, there is mounting opposition 
to Trump’s trade policy from major US cor-
porations and leading associations such as 
the American Chamber of Commerce, the 
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers and 
the Internet Association, the umbrella 
organisation for the digital economy. Sup-
port is still lacking for the campaign against 
import tariffs launched in June by influen-
tial brothers Charles and David Koch who 
control multi-billion dollar Koch Industries. 
They are promoting political initiatives and 
candidates who are committed to opposing 
Trump’s policies. Given that, at first glance, 
the US economy seems to be booming, US 
companies have had little reason to protest 
so far. Looking at average development of 
the share prices of the largest US companies 
listed on the S&P 500, it would appear that 
Donald Trump’s economic policy has pro-
duced only winners. Major companies, in 
particular, have clearly benefitted from last 
year’s tax reform. By contrast, Chinese share 
prices are plummeting (see Figure 2, p. 3). 
However, if one takes a closer look at the 
US stock market, a different picture emerges. 
Gains on the leading US market index S&P 
500 in the first quarter of 2018 were largely 
due to above-average performances by the 
five major technology stocks, Facebook, 
Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Google. Most 
other US companies, however, are suffering 
from the trade conflict. Trump could soon 
encounter resistance from these corpora-
tions. 
Dr. Laura von Daniels is Deputy Head of SWP’s The Americas Division.  
The author would like to thank Manuela Speckbacher for her excellent research on this publication. 
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